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Abstract 
The Basel II Accords have sparked increased interest in the development of 
approaches based on internal ratings systems and have initiated the elaboration of 
models for remote ratings forecasts based on external ones as part of Risk Management 
and Early Warning Systems. This article evaluates the peculiarities of current ratings 
systems and addresses specific issues of development of econometrical rating models 
for emerging market companies. Financial indicators, market-value appraisals and 
macroeconomic indicators of different countries were used as explanatory variables. 
Standard & Poor’s and Moody’s ratings were considered as modeling ratings.  
 
Keywords: corporate ratings, models, financial risk. 
JEL codes: G21, G32. 
                                                 
* Series WP7 «Mathematical methods for decision making in economics, business and politics»; 
Paper WP7/2010/06; Original text: 
https://www.hse.ru/data/2010/09/23/1223926390/WP7_2010_06.pdf  
† † State University Higher School of Economics, 109028, Moscow, Russia, Pokrovskiy bul., 11, J-417; e-
mail: akarminsky@hse.ru). I would like to thank Anatoly Peresetsky for his helpful comments. 
1. Introduction 
Ratings are in high demand in market-driven economies. Within a 
business setting, the rating process has a moral component. A Rating agency’s 
reputational capital serves as a regulatory element (Partnoy, 2002). In addition 
to independent appraisals of investment risk in the form of the rating agency’s 
opinion, ratings also function as a sort of licensing. 
The Basel II Accord (Basel, 2004) has sparked increased interest in 
ratings and their models. The development of approaches based on internal 
ratings systems has a practical interest, especially for developing markets. The 
topic has received increased attention in connection with the global crisis that 
began in 2007.  
In this work, we analyzed possibilities for modeling ratings applied to 
industrial companies and banks of developing countries. Emphasis was placed 
on the elaboration of econometric models. As explanatory variables, financial 
indicators (which characterize the activities of a company), market indicators 
(which reflect the dynamics of its stock quotations), and macroeconomic 
variables and dummies of industrial and country affiliations were employed.  
Ratings of Moody’s Investors Service and Standard & Poor’s agencies 
were considered as modeling ratings. This made the evaluation of the specific 
approaches of each of these agencies possible. Samples were made up of data 
from these agencies and the Bloomberg information agency.  
Analysis of the predictive power of the derived econometric models 
allowed for an appraisal of these models to be made. Particular attention was 
paid to variables in rating models in accordance with their affiliations with 
developing countries or with particular industries. 
It was shown that industry and group of countries affiliation influences 
ratings. 
The work consists of seven sections. The second section addresses the 
particularities of ratings as a measurement of risk in Russia and the countries of 
Central and Eastern Europe. A comparison of the methodologies of the two 
leading agencies was the subject of the third section. In Section 4, there is an 
examination of the types of models used and the formation and statistical 
characteristics of the samples.  
Models of corporate ratings and bank ratings pertaining to developing 
markets and a comparison of ratings of Moody’s and S&P were systematized in 
Sections 5 and 6. Conclusions were presented in the final section. 
 
2. Development of ratings services in developing 
countries  
To begin with, we will consider rating opportunities in Russia. We can 
observe several waves of interest in these instruments. The entry of the 
international rating agencies and the ratings they made in Russia (beginning in 
1996) had little impact before the 1998 financial crisis or immediately after it. 
The opportunity for foreign borrowing, including borrowing by 
industrial companies beginning in 2003, gave impetus to their development. The 
number of ratable objects has more than tripled since then, reaching more than 
300 at the beginning of 2009 (about half of them are banks and more than a third 
are companies.)  The process was encouraged when Russia received investment-
level ratings in 2005-2006.  
The crisis of 2008-2009 has had an effect on the rating process. A 
number of ratings were withdrawn. Russia’s sovereign ratings were lowered by 
Standard & Poor’s and Fitch Ratings by one grade, although the ratings 
remained on the investment level at BBB. The insignificant lowering of 
sovereign ratings did not dampen interest in them from economically active 
objects, as happened in 1998.   
Although a large portion of bank ratings was assigned by Moody’s 
Investors Service (hereinafter, “Moody’s”), the Standard & Poor’s agency 
(hereinafter “S&P”) leads in ratings of industrial companies (Fig. 1) and their 
financial instruments.  
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Fig. 1. Distribution of the total number of ratings and ratings of industrial companies by 
international agencies (January 2009) 
The distribution of international agencies’ corporate ratings by grades 
(Fig. 2) shows that the level of ratings of Russian companies is comparatively 
low. Less than 20 companies have investment-level ratings.  
The average level of ratings was between BB- and BB for all three 
agencies, while the average level for S&P was almost BB- and for Moody’s it 
was Ba2 which is equivalent to BB. For the Fitch Ratings agency, the average 
level was between those grades.  
The average rating level of companies is higher than that of banks. 
Although S&P ratings were practically identical for banks and companies alike, 
companies and regions ratings by Fitch were substantially lower for banks (by 
more than 0.5 and 1.5 grades on average respectively). This applies even to a 
greater degree to Moody’s. This distinction is not only methodological, but also 
connected with the Moody’s wider scope of bank ratings.  
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 Fig. 2. Distribution of ratings of Russian companies by grades (January 2009) 
The ratings of banks and industrial companies in Central and Eastern 
Europe (CEE) have much in common because they are related to developing 
countries. These countries’ development level lags considerably behind that of 
the original members of the European Union. However, these countries were 
oriented toward membership in the EU from the very beginning, and many of 
them have now become members.  
Data analysis shows that sovereign ratings of the countries of the EU are 
in the lower part of the investment range (A and lower), with the exception of 
the higher ratings of Slovakia, Czech Republic (A+) and especially Slovenia 
(AA). Serbia, Macedonia and Bosnia and Herzegovina have speculative ratings.  
At the same time, companies and banks have mainly speculative level 
ratings and the number of rated objects was low (statistical data on the 
comparison between country ratings and banks ratings is presented in Appendix 
1). This is largely explained by European Union’s support for these countries, 
although this support has been limited since the onset of the economical crisis. 
There are few large companies in these countries. The ones that do exist are 
subsidiaries of transnational companies, and this may lower the ratings level, 
considering that their market capitalization (or volume of assets) is one of the 
main explanatory variables for these ratings.  
Thus, despite higher sovereign ratings, company ratings in these 
countries are on the same level as Russian companies: mainly in the upper range 
of speculative ratings. 
Despite the comparative growth in the number of ratings, there are still 
clearly too few of them in developing countries. In addition, rating methods are 
largely inexplicit, and expertise plays a significant role in them. This hinders the 
use of ratings for risk evaluation and decision making even on the state level. 
This is the reason for the interest in the creation of internal ratings and model 
ratings that can be used as preliminary evaluations in making management 
decisions.  
 
3. Overview of the literature and methodology  
3.1. Particulars of corporate credit rating methodology  
The credit ratings of borrowing companies are composed of two elements: a 
business analysis and an analysis of the financial profile (S&P, 2009). Besides 
an analysis of financial indicators, the procedure for assigning a rating consists 
of research of the fundamental characteristics of the business such as country 
risks, the structure of the industry and its perspectives for growth, the 
company’s competitive advantage, the system of regulation, as well as 
management and strategy. Many of these factors are qualitative, although the 
results of future activity depend on them. These factors are also more significant 
for the speculative level of ratings.  
Each of the elements in the process of preparing a ratings statement is 
subjected to a complex examination. The specifics of the industry and any 
nonstandard operations are taken into account during a financial anaylisis. The 
company’s financial policy and its approach to risk management are analyzed. 
Attention is mainly given to cash flow, coefficients of debt and interest 
settlement with cash flow and funds from operations and liquidity. The checklist 
of basic financial indicators influenced the choice of the set of explanatory 
variables in the models discussed below.   
Moody’s agency also gives financial indicators a significant role in the 
assignment of its ratings, in addition to analysis of country and industry factors. 
The agency uses 11 key financial indicators (Moody’s, 2009), a number of 
which are strongly correlated and have exerted influence on the set of 
explanatory variables in the models.  
With regards to the banking sector, factors of support have particular 
significance, and have been methodologically incorporated in (Moody’s, 2007). 
A two-level system of ratings has been formed, in which financial stability 
ratings (Bank Financial Strength Ratings) determine the level of 
creditworthiness of financial institutions without support (stand alone), whereas 
Deposit Ratings take support into account.  Similar steps have been taken 
recently by the S&P, which also considers factors of support from the state and 
from parent companies. 
Our long-term goal is to research the possibility of forecasting bank and 
company ratings based solely on publicly accessible information, including 
indicators from international financial reports and market conditions on stock 
exchanges.  
3.2. Overview of literature on modeling corporate ratings 
Changes in ratings play an important role in transactions with interest-rate 
risks. Despite a decrease in the normative significance of ratings, their presence 
and popularity have grown since the mid-1970s (Partnoy, 2002). This is due 
largely to the regulatory significance of ratings, in addition to their market 
significance (Karminsky, Peresetsky, 2009).  
Although the initial application of ratings was to debt obligations, corporate 
ratings are now steadily gaining significance (Altman and Suggitt, 2000) for the 
organization of syndicated credits, the rating of corporate bonds and other 
purposes (Altman and Saunders, 1998; Servigny and Renault, 2004; Partnoy, 
2002).  
A number of researchers have shown (Altman and Rijken, 2004; Pederzoli 
and Torricelli, 2005; Curry et al., 2008) that ratings are cyclical. There is a 
certain lag between the recording of financial results and the changing of a 
rating. While this creates stability in the rating process and averts reactions to 
comparatively insignificant events, it does not always provide for a timely 
reaction by ratings agencies to significant procedures. The widely-discussed 
collapse of several major companies in the last several years is an example of 
this (Servigny and Renault, 2004). 
At the same time, as (Amato and Furfine, 2004) showed that credit ratings 
have risen less during times of recession using U.S. firms and the S&P data. 
However, ratings do not display excessive sensitivity to business cycles. The 
potential time degradation of ratings (which is due to a change in the extent of 
credit risk) deserves attention. Without discounting this factor, especially for 
new financial instruments (at present predominantly structured transactions), it 
should be noted that degradation may be connected with the dynamics of the 
market as a whole. In regards to banks, the absence of such degradation during 
the transition to ordinal scales was shown in (Karminsky, Peresetsky, 2007).    
The reason for the relative volatility of ratings is the specifics of the 
assignment of country ratings, especially for developing countries (Moody’s, 
2007). In (Kaminsky and Schmucler, 2002; Reinhart, 2002), it is shown that 
there are three possible channels of instability that arise from changes to a 
country rating during a crisis:  
• directly through the value of debt obligations and stock on the market 
• through contagion and generated global unstability 
• due to markets in countries with lower ratings because of their greater 
liability to fluctuations 
In (Reinhart, 2002), it is also shown that changes in sovereign ratings 
influence the spread and income of bonds, complicate access to resources on 
developing markets,  hasten the transition from currency crisis to banking crisis 
and may impact recession. Some of the specifics of the rating process during 
crisis, including in regards to developing countries, are also examined in (Joo 
and Pruitt, 2006). Significant attention has been given to the analysis of 
indicators of financial and banking crises. Developing countries have been a 
mainstay of this research (Kaminsky and Schmucler, 2002; Rojas-Suarez, 2002). 
The evaluation of sufficiency of capital as a measurement of risk based on 
internal ratings according the IRB Approach of Basel II, may be based on 
probability of default or rating models (Basel, 2004). It may also use an 
evaluation of transition matrices and the mechanism of Markov chains 
(Frydman and Schuermann, 2008) or econometric models, including scoring 
(Altman and Saunders, 1998; Altman, 2005; Feng et al., 2008).  
A number of works have been devoted to the elaboration of internal ratings 
systems and early warning. An overview of methodological specifics of 
elaborating models is made in (Altman and Saunders, 1998; Karminsky et al., 
2005).  
In (Carey and Hrycay, 2001), specifics of the joint use of several methods 
for the evaluation of the probability of default on debt instruments according to 
an internal rating scale were examined. Mapping to a standardized scale and 
scoring models were implemented. The presence of a data series of long 
duration is critical. A number of the specifics of the elaboration of internal 
ratings systems are also examined in (Jacobson et al., 2006; Servigny and 
Renault, 2004; Hanson and Schuermann, 2006). In the last of these works, the 
confidence interval technique was used to refine rating gradation.  
Selection of the explanatory variables is methodologically important for the 
elaboration of corporate ratings models. The indicators that are employed by the 
rating agencies may be used (Moody’s, 2009; S&P, 2008). Others which have 
been employed by researchers may be used (Rojas-Suarez, 2002; Servigny and 
Renault, 2004; Guttler and Wahrenburg, 2007; Curry et al., 2008). Typical 
indicators are the size of the company, its profitability, stability, liquidity and 
structure of the business, as expressed through companies’ balance-sheet 
figures. In recent years, the use of such factors as state support for companies, 
and support from the parent company or group of companies has become more 
prominent (Moody’s, 2007; S&P, 2009). 
The use of macroeconomic indicators has also become more typical recently 
(Carling et al., 2007; Curry et al., 2008; Peresetsky, Karminsky, 2008). Among 
the most common indicators are inflation index, real GDP growth, industrial 
production growth and, for export-oriented countries, oil prices and changes in 
the cross-rate of currencies. Separate mention should be made of market 
indicators (Curry et al., 2008), which is especially important for publicly held 
companies (market value of companies, volatility of stock prices, systemic 
parameters, etc.).  
It should also be noted that alternate indicators can also be used for 
developing countries (Altman, 2005; Rojas-Suarez, 2002; Karminsky et al., 
2005). These are characteristic of developing markets and predominantly 
speculative ratings. They include the value of resources, percent margin, pace of 
asset growth and growth of interbank debt (also on an international level). 
Variation over time, both of the dimensions of the risk and the approaches 
of the rating agencies, points to the use of a time factor in models. The use of 
panel data may also be incorporated. Some of the specifics of these approaches 
are found in (Elton et al., 2004; Frydman and Schuermann, 2008).   
The particular significance of industry affiliation and possible differences 
among ratings of companies of varied profiles and regions can be noted for 
corporate ratings (Niemann et al., 2008). This is connected with the specifics of 
business in various segments of production activity. Industry-specific models 
and the use of dummies depending on the industry and country of companies are 
possible.  
A number of works have noted differences in the ratings of various agencies 
(Packer, 2002; Bae, Klein, 1997; Kish et al., 1999). Corresponding factors of 
national and international agencies were analyzed in those works. In practically 
all the research, the two main rating agencies, Moody’s and the S & P, were 
considered.  
 
3.3. Ratings during the global financial crisis: is there an outlook for growth? 
The global financial crisis exposed a number of problems of the ratings 
business and the entire financial management system. The financial system grew 
markedly in the first decade of the 2000s (IMF, 2009). New financial 
instruments were created. They were designed for higher profit with lower 
expected levels of risk. However, the inability of regulatory organs and rating 
agencies to evaluate the threat from the asset price bubble appeared limited. 
Faith in light regulation based on the discipline of the financial market and 
hope for the successful distribution of risks through financial innovation does 
not preclude their concentration. An IMF analysis shows problems on three 
levels:  
• Financial regulatory and monitoring organs proved to be incapable of 
exposing a higher concentration of risk brought on by rapid growth in financial 
innovation. 
• No account was taken of growing macroeconomic imbalances that 
contributed to the growth of systemic risk in the financial system and real estate 
market. 
• International financial organizations and the monitoring and control 
system that was in place were unable to cooperate reliably on the international 
level to identify vulnerable areas in transnational relations.  
Heightened possibilities of infection during the liquidity deficit are noted in 
(Karas et al., 2008) in regard to the Russian banking stystem and developing 
markets. It is shown there that regulating the liquidity of individual banks is not 
sufficient to avoid a systemic crisis. Resource management by the lender of last 
resort is necessary to restore the coordination of the MBK.   
The crisis emphasized the need for clearer signals in economic policy and 
the development of international cooperation on a number of economic and 
financial issues including ratings. Among the measures suggested was taking 
leadership in responsive measures to systemic global risk. The establishment of 
an early warning system is a good example of this.  
Development and regulation of early warning systems requires improved 
independent evaluation. Rating agencies should play a crucial role in this 
process. Policy has to be coordinated in various areas, including supervision of 
the rating agencies, bookkeeping practices and auditing. These measures should 
be coordinated both within a country and on the international level (IMF, 2009).  
Among the problems that arise in connection with the financial crisis, rating 
agencies’ lag in the methodology of assigning ratings may be cited. Another 
factor is the calculation of systemic risks of the global financial system and a lag 
in the evaluation of complex financial instruments. The more active role 
agencies have taken in the development of methodology, including areas 
emphasized by the Basel committee may be noted (Basel, 2009).  
 
4. Data and models 
4.1. Models and rating scales 
Multiple choice probit models were used for follow-up studies. Earlier, they 
had been used for the elaboration of bank rating models (Magnus et al., 2007). 
Further, three numerical scales were used. These correspond to the use of 
classes and gradations as scales of ratings as well as a mixed scale which 
enables the limitation of the sample volume. The mapping of these scales to the 
numerical scales has 8, 18 and 12 levels, respectively, and a higher rating 
corresponds to a lower number.  
4.2. The Sample: financial and market variables, macrovariables and ratings 
To elaborate ratings models for industrial enterprises, a sample was made on 
the principle of affiliation with companies in a number of industries (oil and gas, 
metals, retail trade, energy, telecommunications and heavy industry) that are 
potential competitors of Russian production companies of the same profile. 
Conditions for selection in the sample were: the presence of an S&P rating 
at the time the sample was made, affiliation with a selected industry, 
accessibility of financial data and market indicators, and tradability, as indicated 
by a liquid market for the company’s stock. In the sample, there were 215 
companies from 39 countries with S&P ratings as of Spring, 2008. 
The sovereign and corporate credit ratings of companies were taken from 
the websites of the S&P and Moody’s agencies as they appeared in March, 2008 
(S&P only) and February, 2009. Financial and market indicators were taken 
from the Bloomberg information system. A minimum of one financial indicator 
was assumed in each of the following groups: market valuation, size, 
profitability, market risks, balance-sheet and cash flow.   
Distribution of the companies represented in the sample by rating gradation 
as of Spring, 2008 is presented in Fig. 3. The low number of companies with 
ratings in categories AAA, AA and B justified the use of a mixed scale with 
differentiation of gradation in classes А to В.  
More than half the companies were represented by five countries: U.S. (74), 
Russia (31), Canada (15), Great Britain (13) and Japan (10). Division of the 
countries into developed or developing economies was done according to the 
methodology of the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The sample contains a 
greater number of companies from developed countries (152) than from 
developing (63). Among developing countries additionally to Russia there was 
Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hun gary, Poland and other coutries’ companies. Among 
developed countries additionally to USA, Canada, Great Britain and Japan there was 
practi cally all countries from «old» European Union. 
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 Fig. 3. Distribution of companies in the sample by gradation of rating 
The time lag between financial indicators and ratings was determined to be 
1.5 years (financial indicators were taken from Autumn, 2007 and ratings from 
the beginning of 2009). This agrees with the conclusions reached in (Karminsky, 
Peresetsky, 2007) and with a number of other works such as (Altman, Rijken, 
2004). Financial and market data for only one accounting period can be 
considered a flaw in the sample‡.  
The sample for banks included (Peresetsky, Karminsky, 2008) about 1000 
observations in 2002-2005 of 380 banks in 42 developing and developed 
countries. The distribution of the sample by gradation and region, and the 
statistical distinctions of the sample can be found in this work also.  
4.3. Explanatory variables and descriptive statistics 
                                                 
‡ Semiannual lag calculations resulted somewhat lower outcomes. Bank models testify about 
very flat lag extremum within half to two-year range. The similar hypothesis for companies will 
be verified to the end of 2010 when the crisis impact on ratings could be assessed. Measures 
undertaken in the beginning of 2009 to overcome the crisis virtually did not affect both final 
financial results and ratings. 
The list of the main financial and market indicators used for the elaboration 
of the rating models, as well as their descriptions and the expected influence on 
the ratings of industrial companies, is presented in Table 1. Descriptive statistics 
and the regression correlation matrix are contained in Appendix 2. Supplemental 
indicators have been used in a number of models, as described in the text.  
Table 1 
Main financial and market indicators used in rating models 
Indicator Designatio
n 
Formula Group Expected 
influence 
Market capitalization  Market 
Capitaliza-
tion 
Stock price*  
Number of shares 
(mln USD) 
Size + 
 
 Return on a share 
(reciprocal value) 
Price/ 
Earnings 
Price per share/Net 
earnings from one 
share 
Market 
indicators 
 
Return on assets ROA Net earnings/Average 
assets 
Profitabi-
lity 
+ 
Operating margin Operating 
Margin 
Operating revenue/ 
Receipts 
Profitabi-
lity 
+ 
Volume of borrowing to 
EBITDA Ratio 
Debt/ 
EBITDA 
Debt/Earnings before 
deductions (interest 
expenses, taxes and 
amortization)  
Balance-
sheet and 
cash flow 
(BCF) 
+ 
Cash flow per year to 
receipts Ratio 
Cash flow/ 
Sales 
Cash flow/Receipts Profitabi-
lity 
+ 
Volume of borrowing to 
assets Ratio 
Debt/Asset
s 
Debt/Assets BCF  
Long-term debt to capital 
Ratio 
LT Debt/ 
Total 
Capital 
Long-term 
debt/Capital 
BCF _ 
Gross profit to interest 
expenses Ratio 
EBITDA/ 
Interest 
expenses 
Profit before 
deductions/Interest 
expenses 
Profitabi-
lity 
+ 
Proxy for current liquidity Current 
ratio 
Short-term assets/ 
Short-term liabilities 
Liquidity  
Share of fixed assets in 
assets 
Fix Assets/ 
Total 
Assets 
Fixed assets/Assets BCF  
Share value to cash flow 
Ratio  
Price/ Cash 
flow 
Share value/Cash flow Market 
indicators 
+ 
Systemic risk for the last 2 
years 
Beta Cov(Ri, Rm)/Var(Rm) Market 
indicators 
 
Volatility of share price in a 
year  
Volatility Var(Ri)^0.40 Market 
indicators 
 
We will characterize market risks by the last three indicators. The Beta 
coefficient shows how much dividend yield correlates with market yield, and the 
Volatility indicator characterizes the variability of share price per year.  
Country distinctions were characterized by macrovariables: annual rate of 
inflation; real GDP growth; CPI (Corruption Perception Index); and sovereign 
rating, which may be seen as a proxy for the institutional environment in which 
a company functions. The first two indicators were taken from data from 2007 
(World Bank), the corruption index comes from Transparency International, and 
the sovereign ratings were taken from rating agency data. The expected 
influences of inflation and corruption were negative. The remaining indicators 
were positive. Higher CPI designations correspond to lower levels of corruption.  
A number of dummies were also used in the models. The relationships of 
companies to countries with developed economies Dev (1- developed, 0- 
developing) and to Russia were introduced for an analysis of the influence of 
affiliation to the groups on the rating level. Companies’ liability to risks in 
dependence of its affiliation with various industries was traced through the 
introduction of a dummy of affiliation in the following sectors: 
telecommunication, oil and gas, metal and mining, consumer, utilities, and 
manufacturing and chemicals. 
The choice of explanatory variables for banks was created the same way 
(Karminsky, Peresetsky, 2007; Peresetsky, Karminsky, 2008). Variables used in 
the models will be commented on in the analysis of the resulting tables.  
5. Econometric corporate rating models  
5.1. Base model and its improvement  
The models examined in this work depend exclusively on open 
information. Accordingly, we examined possibilities derived from the use of 
indicators based on company financial accounts prepared to international 
standards and supplemental possibilities provided by macrovariables and market 
elements. 
Among the questions that we faced in elaborating rating models, we 
emphasized the following: 
 Do the ratings of enterprises depend on their affiliation with a group of 
countries (developing countries, Russia)?  
 Do ratings depend on affiliation with an industry? 
 Is it possible to incorporate a high enough level of information in sovereign 
ratings using macrovariables?  
In the elaboration of the base rating model for the Standard & Poor’s 
agency, indicators were chosen from each group of financial indicators. We 
considered the capitalization of the company as the indicator of its size for all 
models. As criteria for comparison at the first stage, statistical characteristics of 
the quality of the models (Pseudo-R2, t-statistics) were used, to which predictive 
characteristics were added at the next stage.   
The models derived with the use of the scale for rating classes as a 
dependent variable were presented in Table 2. Coefficient signs matched prior 
expectations.   
Positive influence on the rating level is exerted by factors such as a 
company’s market capitalization, return on assets and level of income in relation 
to interest expenses. Positive influence on the operating margin was expected. It 
is the basis of a company’s stability. 
The negative influence of the relationship of long-term debt to capital is 
also intuitive, since rating agencies closely follow the level of borrowing and the 
probability of repayment. The negative influence of the proxy for current 
liquidity is natural, since it is the reciprocal value of the current liquidity 
indicator. Cross-impact of financial indicators was not revealed. 
 
 
Table 2 
Rating class models 
 Model number and agency (sp = S&P; mo = Moody’s) 
 Base S&P Quadratic S&P Market S&P Base Moody’s 
Capitalization (logarithm) -0.617*** 2.805* -0.770*** -0.445** 
 (0.178) (1.475) (0.177) (0.813) 
Squared  -0.426**   
  (0.182)   
Return on assets -0.063*** -0.132***  -0.065*** 
 (0.0178) (0.032)  (0.019) 
Squared  0.0034***   
  (0.0010)   
EBITDA/Interest expenses -0.011*** -0.030*** -0.016*** -0.014* 
 (0.0040) (0.010) (0.0036) (0.0079) 
Squared  0.00010**   
  (0.00005)   
Long-term debt/Capital 0.015*** 0.021***  0.021*** 
 (0.0056) (0.0068)  (0.0058) 
Total debt/EBITDA -0.059 -0.215**   
  (0.092)   
Cash flow/Sales    0.019*** 
    (0.0072) 
Proxy for current liquidity 0.242*   0.497*** 
 (0.142)   (0.154) 
Volatility of value   0.065***  
   (0.012)  
Share value/Cash flow   -0.025***  
                               (0.0086)  
Telecommunication -1.107** -1.428*** -0.430 -1.638*** 
 (0.442) (0.386) (0.427) (0.487) 
Metal and mining -1.514*** -1.668*** -1.702*** -1.227** 
 (0.429) (0.425) (0.454) (0.488) 
Oil and gas -1.884*** -1.722*** -1.733*** -1.728*** 
 (0.491) (0.392) (0.427) (0.481) 
Consumer -1.504*** -1.893*** -1.168** -1.015* 
 (0.491) (0.475) (0.493) (0.529) 
Utilities -2.795*** -2.909*** -1.804*** -2.900*** 
 (0.442) (0.441) (0.465) (0.513) 
Inflation level 0.463*** 0.352*** 0.567*** 0.374*** 
 (0.089) (0.074) (0.085) (0.086) 
GDP growth -0.171** -0.197*** -0.262*** -0.029 
 (0.070) (0.069) (0.061) (0.086) 
Developed countries -0.714** -1.170***  0.334 
 (0.358) (0.362)  (0.391) 
Pseudo-R2 0.321 0.354 0.350 0.273 
Exact forecast ∆=0, % 39 37 43 42 
\Not more than 1 class∆1,% 53 56 48 48 
*, **, *** signify 10%-, 5%- and 1%-level of significance, respectively. 
The signs for the indicators “Ratio of total debt to gross profit” and 
“Ratio of cash flow to volume of sales” require additional comment. The sign of 
the coefficients of the former can be explained by the high level of correlation 
with the ratio of long-term debt to capital (in percents). In a number of models, 
that indicator is meaningless, and its absence is not detrimental to the quality of 
the model. Similar explanations are possible for the indicator “Ratio of cash 
flow to sales volume.” Total debt/EBITDA indicator is not significant or 
excluded from the models due to high correlation with Long-term debt/Capital 
ratio (see appendix 2). 
The inclusion of macroeconomic indicators as well as the consideration 
of the factor of industry and country affiliation raised the quality of the base 
model to minimal acceptability. The influence of macroeconomic factors on the 
rating was expected: negative for inflation and positive for the GDP growth. 
This determines the level of stability of the external business environment.  
Affiliation with developed countries in our research was not an obvious 
positive factor which was connected with the correlation present between this 
element and the macroenvironment indicator. Russian companies were not 
significantly distinguishable from companies in developing countries.  
Affiliation with an industry has an influence on the rating. In particular, 
ratings of utilities companies, and those in the oil and gas sector are 
differentiated from heavy industry companies.  
The introduction of quadratic dependences in a number of explanatory 
variables, i.e., capitalization, return on assets has improved the statistical 
characteristics of the model. The minimum point for return on assets and 
EBITDA to Interest expenses ratio lies outside the interval of significance of the 
variable. The sign for the coefficient is entirely defined by a linear member and 
the tendency is preserved.  The variables used explain the ratings even without 
the use of the country rating.  
The use of a stock market indicator (the market model) is an area which 
may be improved for models of publicly-traded companies (that is those with 
market quotations). Indicators of value volatility, level of systemic risk, ratio of 
share value to cash flow, as well as an indicator of market discipline in the 
country where the company was located (in the form of the corruption index) 
took place in our distribution. 
Systemic risk was insignificant in practically all the models examined. 
Volatility of value negatively influenced the level of the rating because the 
market risks of the given asset grew when it took place. Growth of share value 
in relation to cash flow had a positive influence on the rating. The positive 
influence of capitalization, the ratio of gross earnings to interest expenses and 
return on assets was preserved, as was the influence of macroeconomic 
indicators. The index of corruption was insignificant in the models. This factor 
apparently has less influence on real production as compared with the 
administrative and financial spheres.  
An analysis of the predictive power of the models was conducted by 
making a comparison of the true ratings of enterprises with their model values. 
Errors in forecast ∆ as the difference between the forecasted and real ratings (in 
the numerical scale of classes), were used as a measurement. The accuracy of 
the forecast is on the level of 39-43%. The portion of forecasts that err by no 
more than one class is on the level of 90-92%. That is somewhat worse than for 
models elaborated for banks (Karminsky, Peresetsky, 2007). 
That may be partly due to the insufficient volume of the sample, 
stratification by different industries and the use of a scale when there was a large 
quantity of ratings on the borders of class gradations. One more factor that is 
substantive for a comparison of forecast accuracy is the moment at which the 
sample is formed and the potential influence of the world financial crisis.  
5.2. Models of corporate ratings on a mixed scale 
As one of the areas for the improvement of the quality of the model, 
transition to a scale of gradations or a mixed scale may be considered. This 
would ensure the reasonable accuracy of the models. Relevant models are 
presented in Table 3. 
Table 3 
Models of ratings on scales of gradations and a mixed scale 
 S&P  S&P, market Moody’s 
Scale Gradations Mixed Gradations Mixed Mixed 
Volatility of value     0.022***  0.068***  
   (0.0060) (0.011)  
Share value/Cash flow   -0.015** -0.26***  
   (0.0075) (0.0078)  
Capitalization (logarithm) -0.517*** -0.509*** -0.528*** -0.588*** -0.502*** 
 (0.151) (0.153) (0.154) (0.158) (0.158) 
EBITDA/Interest expenses -0.0062* -0.0062* -0.0089*** -0.0086*** -0.017** 
 (0.0034) (0.0035) (0.0033) (0.0033) (0.0070) 
Return on assets -0.035*** -0.033** -0.042*** -0.041*** -0.032** 
 (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) (0.014) 
Long-term debt/Capital -0.012* -0.012**    0.0095* 
 (0.0045) (0.0047)   (0.0049) 
Inflation level  0.379***  0.391***  0.443***  0.561***  0.345*** 
 (0.063) (0.065) (0.070) (0.077) (0.069) 
GDP growth -0.186*** -0.184*** -0.185*** -0.252*** -0.96 
 (0.060) (0.060) (0.185) (0.053) (0.076) 
Metal and mining   -0.456* -0.835***  
   (0.258) (0.270)  
Oil and gas -0.619*** -0.625*** -0.866*** -0.954*** -0.413* 
 (0.197) (0.198) (0.212) (0.215) (0.228) 
Utilities -1.217*** -1.223*** -1.127*** -0.973*** -1.403*** 
 (0.0224) (0.0225) (0.234) (0.238) (0.243) 
Developed countries -0.636** -0.611**   0.086 
 (0.308) (0.310)   (0.355) 
Pseudo-R2 0.159 0.169 0.166 0.219 0.148 
Accuracy of forecast ∆ = 0,  34 31 35 39 33 
Error up to 1 gradation∆ 
1,%   
52 57 51 50 57 
Error up to 2 gradations∆ 
2,% 
14 12 13 10 9 
*, **, *** signify 10%-, 5%- and 1%-level of significance, respectively. 
For models using market indicators, as before, volatility of a company’s 
share value exerted a negative influence. The influence of the ratio of share 
value to cash flow was positive. Among the balance indicators, size of the 
company (capitalization) retained its positive influence. Profit to interest 
expenses ratio and return on assets did too. The influence of the settlement of 
long-term debt to capital ratio was also positive. This was due to the high 
negative correlation of this variable with the three previous ones.  
Level of inflation was the definitive macroeconomic variable. The relevant 
coefficients were significant in all models and had negative influence. GDP 
growth had positive influence, but its presence in the models may have varied 
because of its high correlation with the inflation indicator. The level of 
corruption was not included in the model. This was due in part to the presence 
of affiliation with the developing countries dummy among the explanatory 
variables. 
The positive influence on the ratings of companies affiliated with the oil, 
gas and utilities industries could be noted. Moreover, an analysis of average 
deviations showed that this tendency was stable.  
Accuracy of forecasts with an error of 1 gradation was about 90% and with 
an error of no more than 2 gradations was higher than 99%, which was better 
than the error for models in the scale of classes. Distribution of errors for the 
market model on a mixed scale is shown in the bar chart (Fig. 4). For that 
model, errors of the first type on the level of 1 gradation did not exceed 4-5%.  
 
 
Fig. 4.  Bar chart of errors for the market model 
5.3. Rating models for banks 
Modeling bank financial strength rating (BFSR) and bank deposits rating 
were presented in grades and had nearly the same quality of models forecast. 
The following conclusions may be drawn from an analysis of these (Peresetsky 
and Karminsky, 2008).  
Banks located in developing countries have a lower BFSR than banks in 
developed countries. The negative significance of the explanatory dummy of 
affiliation with developing markets, which is quite logical, should also be 
brought to attention. The difference of evaluations of Russian, Kazak and 
Ukrainian banks in comparison with banks of developing market should also be 
noted (for reasons that include the level of corruption and political risk). This 
indicates the potential for banks’ ratings growth in CIS countries.  
The volume of assets has a positive effect. Parameters reflecting efficiency 
(ratio of personnel expenses to operating income), the quality of assets (ratio of 
overdue debt to all debt) and ratio of client funds to own capital are significant. 
Growth of personnel expenses, bad debts and financial leveraging has a negative 
influence on the BFSR.  
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The cost of liabilities has negative influence what means that banks which 
payed more to obtain funds have a worse BFSR indicator. The cost of resources 
determines the level of stability and efficiency of banks’ activities.  
 
6. Comparative analysis of the corporate ratings of the 
two agencies  
We made a statistical comparison of the ratings of the S&P and Moody’s 
agencies. We used a subsample containing observations of companies that had 
ratings from both agencies. This sample amounted to 178 companies.  
Three measures of difference were used for the comparison:  
∆ - the difference between S&P and Moody’s ratings 
FDS = ∆ 
SPLIT - a binary function that takes the value of 0 when the ratings coincide 
and 1 otherwise.  
 For each measure, we elaborated econometric models to determine the 
factors that significantly influenced the distribution of opinions in the agencies 
as expressed in their ratings. The results of the comparison were presented in 
Table 4. 
The following conclusions may be made from an analysis of the table: 
1. The most substantial difference was the rating of companies from 
developing countries. It was expressed either directly through the appropriate 
dummy of affiliation with developed countries or indirectly as the influence of 
corruption.  
2. Among the most significant and positive factors influencing the 
ratings of Moody’s agency, return on assets may be noted. For the other agency, 
factors such as instant liquidity, share of fixed assets in total assets, level of 
inflation and corruption were more significant.  
 Table 4 
Comparison of the ratings of the S&P and Moody’s agencies 
 Model number  
Difference  ∆ Difference module ABS SPLIT 
distinction 
 1d 2d 1a 2a 1s 
Return on assets 0.028** 0.022*    
 (0.011) (0.011)    
Instant liquidity -0.462*** -0.507***    
 (0.140) (0.150)    
Fixed assets/Assets  -0.924**    
  (0.383)    
Share value/Cash flow  -0.0098    
  (0.0073)    
Value volatility   -0.007* -0.006 -0.0038* 
   (0.0036) (0.0036) (0.0023) 
Inflation level -0.221*** -0.156***    
 (0.056) (0.060)    
Corruption index -0.303*** -0.305*** -0.81   
 (0.060) (0.058) (0.053)   
Consumer sector -0.857*** -1.084*** -0.169   
 (0.284) (0.288) (0.216)   
Developed countries    -0.572** -0.838*** -0.309*** 
   (0.237) (0.163) (0.086) 
Russia   -0.649*** -0.098  
   (0.243) (0.341)  
Other insignificant    +  
 0.182 0.217 0.127 0.140 0.061 
3. No substantial difference in the ratings of Russian companies was 
uncovered. The positive influence of the dummy of affiliation with Russia 
indicated the presence of large differences in ratings both on the positive and 
negative sides (model 1а).  
4. Growth of the volatility of companies’ share value creates 
multidirectional differences, although not at a very high level of significance – 
10% (models 1а and 1s). This indirectly confirmed the previous conclusion.  
5. The S&P agency takes a more critical position toward companies from 
the consumer sector (models 1d and 2d). On average, the divergence between 
the agencies’ ratings, expressed as their difference ∆, was 0.26 gradation for our 
sample and is characterized by the bar chart in Fig. 5. 
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Fig. 5. Sample distribution of the difference between the ratings of the S&P 
and Moody’s agencies 
 
Conclusion 
Remote probability evaluations based on econometric models should be 
an integral part of internal rating systems which determine the potential practical 
significance of such models, especially in developing countries.  In this work, 
rating models of industrial enterprises and of the financial stability of 
corporations and banks were elaborated based on multiple choice models. 
Financial indicators of corporations and banks, dummies of regional affiliation 
of banks and years were employed as explanatory variables.  
It was demonstrated that: 
1. When other conditions are equal, industrial companies and banks in 
developing countries receive lower ratings in comparison with banks in 
developed countries. Factors which determine lower ratings for emerging 
countries require additional analysis as well as factors determining 
higher market volatility in such countries. 
2. Ratings depend on affiliation with an industry. The upper ratings have 
utility companies, also as oil&gas, metal and mining and consumer 
industries. 
3. A set of explanatory financial indicators is sufficient and easily inter preted to 
rating models. The degree of influence of country affiliation, re turn on assets, 
instant liquidity, inflation level and corruption are prominent factors that 
differentiate between the approaches of the two agencies. 
4. The predictive power of models of corporate ratings and bank financial 
strength ratings is somewhat better than deposit rating models. The 
deviations present are mostly explainable by quality factors.  
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Appendix 1 
Distribution of ratings of developing countries 
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Appendix 2 
Descriptive statistics and sample correlation matrix for industrial enterprises 
Descriptive statistics 
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Mean  8.14  18.64  2.03  22.89  19.10  1.29  4.16  34.31 
Median  7.18  10.81  1.50  18.50  16.82  1.10  4.19  30.62 
Maximum  40.56  241.77  9.63  72.87  59.53  4.06  5.67  149.16 
Minimum -12.82  1.240  0.030  0.38 -6.10  0.17  2.33  0.01 
Standard 
deviation 
 6.39  25.84  1.67  15.05  12.40  0.71  0.55  20.18 
 
Correlation matrix 
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Return on assets  1.00  0.422 -0.564  0.311  0.563  0.259  0.290 -0.333 
EBITDA/Interest 
expenses 
 0.422  1.00 -0.426   0.128  0.211  0.183  0.176 -0.445 
Total debt/EBITDA -0.564 -0.426  1.00 -0.253 -0.357 -0.199 -0.235  0.688 
Cash flow/Sales  0.311  0.128 -0.253  1.00  0.781 -0.174  0.016 -0.052 
Operating margin  0.564  0.211 -0.357  0.780  1.00  0.075  0.073 -0.144 
Proxy for current liquidity  0.259  0.183 -0.198 -0.174  0.075  1.00  0.015 -0.212 
Capitalization (logarithm) 0.290  0.176  -0.235  0.016  0.073  0.015  1.00 -0.268 
Long-term debt/Capital -0.333 -0.445  0.688 -0.052 -0.144 -0.212 -0.269  1.00 
 
Descriptive statistics 
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Mean 8.14  18.64 2.03 22.89 19.10 1.29 4.16 34.31 
Median 7.18  10.81 1.50 18.50 16.82 1.10 4.19 30.62 
Maximum 40.56  241.77 9.63 72.87 59.53 4.06 5.67 149.16 
Minimum –12.82  1.24 0.03 0.38 –6.10 0.17 2.33 0.01 
Standard 
deviation 
6.39 25.84 1.67 15.05 12.40 0.71 0.55 20.18 
 
